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Jack Ryan, J.D.

Jack Ryan, J.D.

Jack Ryan is a retired 20 year veteran and former Captain with the Providence, RI Police Dept. He obtained his Juris Doctorate from Suffolk University Law School and is a member of both the Rhode Island and Federal Bar.

Jack is the Co-director of the Legal & Liability Risk Management Institute (www.llrmi.com). LLRMI is a division of PATC which provides legal services relating to risk management for law enforcement agencies and academic institutions nationwide. He is recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as an Expert Witness on the matters of generally accepted policies and practices in public safety.


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Legal & Liability Issues in Schools

Legal & Liability Issues in Schools

During this two-day seminar, attendees are provided in-depth details and analysis of up-to-date legal considerations that shape policies and practices in a school setting.

The event is held annually at the Western States Training Conference and is also available regionally by open-registration for private in-service training for your institution.

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Search and Seizure in the Schools

- by Jack Ryan
Legal & Liability Risk Management Institute

In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 the United States Supreme Court outlined the standards that applied to schoolhouse searches conducted by school officials.    On March 7, 1980, a teacher at the Piscataway High School in New Jersey discovered two girls smoking cigarettes in the lavatory.  The teacher brought the duo to Assistant Vice Principal, Mr. Choplick for violating a school rule against smoking.  T.L.O.’s companion admitted to the rule violation.  T.L.O. steadfastly denied that she was smoking.  T.L.O. was then taken to Mr. Choplick’s office where he demanded to see her purse.  As he searched the purse for cigarettes, Mr. Choplick discovered rolling papers.  This heightened Mr. Choplick’s suspicion.  He then conducted a closer inspection of the purse.  He found a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, several empty baggies, a substantial quantity of one-dollar bills and an index cards with students’ names on it that appeared to be a customer list.

Mr. Choplick notified T.L.O.’s mother and the police.  The evidence of drug-dealing was turned over to the police.  T.L.O. was taken to the police station by her mother at the request of the police.  T.L.O. confessed to selling marijuana in school and was charged by the police.  At trial, T.L.O. attempted to have the marijuana suppressed as evidence arguing that her Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by Mr. Choplick’s search of the purse without a warrant or probable cause.

In its review of the case, the United States Supreme Court rejected T.L.O.’s Fourth Amendment claim and outlined the parameters of searches conducted by school officials.  The Court determined that although searches in public schools are within the purview of the Fourth Amendment, warrants and probable cause are not required in the context of a search by school officials.  The Court held: “We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in concluding that the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based upon probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law.  Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on reasonableness, under all of the circumstances, of the search.”  The Court then applied a two-fold analysis for determining the reasonableness of any particular search.  First, was the search justified at its inception?  In the school setting, a search will be justified at its inception “when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.”  Second, the scope of the search must be reasonably related to the “circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” “Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”  The Court noted that the T.L.O. decision only applied to searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and that the case did not address the question of what the appropriate standard might be for searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with law enforcement officers.

A case from the Court of Appeals of North Carolina summarizes the current trends in relation to searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with law enforcement officials.  In the Matter of D.D.,   involved a report to the principal by a teacher that she had overheard a conversation regarding an after-school fight involving students from another school.  In response to this information, the Principal notified the school resource officer.  The principal and the school resource officer took up surveillance positions at opposite ends of the school as dismissal was about to take place.  Principal Hicks observed some females in a parking lot where no one should be prior to dismissal.  Joined by Officer May, Officer Burwell and Officer McDonald, the four men approached these females in the parking lot.  Only one of the females was a student at the school.  The remaining three gave evasive and deceptive answer regarding where they attended school and why they were not presently in school.  One of the officers searched the purse of one of the females and discovered a box cutter.  The girls were then taken to the principal’s office.  In subsequent testimony, Principal Hicks reported that he believed it was his obligation to find out where these students belonged since he knew that none of the schools in the district would have dismissed them early.

At some point Principal Hicks reminded the officers that his information was that these females were coming to his high school to fight.  In light of that information, Principal Hicks made a decision to search the females.  He ordered the girls to empty their pockets which led to the discovery of a knife on one of the females, D.D.  D.D. was charged with violating a North Carolina statute prohibiting the possession of weapons on school grounds.  On appeal D.D. argued that the standards from T.L.O. did not apply to her case since she was not a student at the school where she was searched.  She further argued that since the police were involved, a heightened standard of suspicion was required.

In rejecting D.D.’s claim the North Carolina Court of Appeal asserted that “inherent in the educational setting is a need to maintain ‘swift and informal disciplinary procedures’…Schools are a unique environment where officials must be able to move quickly when dealing with immediate threats to a school’s proper educational environment and student safety…School officials not only educate students who are compelled to attend school, but they have a responsibility to protect those students and their teachers from behavior that threatens their safety and the integrity of the learning process.  With the growing incidence of violence and dangerous weapons in schools, this task has become increasingly difficult.”  The court concluded that the law did not distinguish students from non-students when setting standards to maintain order and safety in the schools.

The juvenile’s second argument concerning the involvement of the police officers led the court to a review and analysis of similar cases from other jurisdictions.  The court distinguished three types of school searches.  The first type is one that involves an independent investigation and action by a school official where the standards set out in T.L.O. clearly applies.  The second type involves investigations by school resource officers that are employed directly by the school department.  In a review of several cases, the court concluded that a majority of courts apply the T.L.O. standard to this type of case as well.   The North Carolina Court of Appeals then distinguished those cases “in which outside law enforcement officers search students as part of an independent investigation or in which the school official search students at the request or behest of the outside law enforcement officers and law enforcement agencies.”  Under this third scenario, courts have generally required officers to meet the probable cause standard to justify a search.

In rejecting the juvenile’s claim the court cited numerous cases that applied the T.L.O. standard “where a police officer works in conjunction with school officials, in varying degrees, to maintain a safe and educational environment.  The application of T.L.O. in situations where law enforcement acts in conjunction with school officials is based on the premise that:

[a] police investigation that includes the search of a public school student, when the search is initiated by the police and conducted by police, usually lacks the commonality of interests existing between teachers and students.  But when school officials, who are responsible for the welfare and education of all the students within the campus, initiate an investigation and conduct it on school grounds in conjunction with the police, the school has brought the police into the school-student relationship.

The court concluded that the officers in this case merely acted in conjunction with Principal Hicks to further his “obligations to maintain a safe, educational environment and to report truants from other schools.

In re Johnny F, involved a search conducted by a search conducted by a “campus security aide at North Park High School.”  In this case, the security aide, Absolo and a counselor named “Crabtree” were investigating a tagging incident that occurred in a high school classroom.  Absolo and Crabtree went to the particular classroom during the third period of the school day based on information from a teacher who indicated that the tagging occurred during the third period.

Upon entering the classroom Absolo informed students that he and Crabtree were going to search for markers and told students to empty their pockets on the desk.  When Johnny F. emptied his pockets, Absolo observed a lighter on his desk.  Since students were prohibited from having lighters Absolo picked it up and handed it to Crabtree.  Crabtree sniffed the lighter and detected the smell of marijuana.  He handed it back to Absolo who reached the same conclusion after sniffing the lighter.  The two then took Johnny F. to the principal’s officer.

At the office, the principal instructed Absolo to search Johnny F.  While patting the juvenile down the Absolo observed a plastic baggie in Johnny’s open pocket.  After questioning the minor admitted it was marijuana and allowed Absolo to seize it.

On appeal, the juvenile argued that the search in the classroom was general in nature and could not be supported by articulable, reasonable suspicion.  In rejecting this claim, the court pointed out that a teacher had provided information that the tagging incident in the classroom had occurred during the third period, thus establishing reasonable suspicion to believe that someone who was assigned to that classroom during the third period was responsible for the tagging.  The court concluded that the search of the students for markers was justified at its inception and the actual search, having the students empty their pockets on the desk was reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the search at the outset.

Citations:


New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).

In the Matter of D.D., 554 S.E. 2d 346 (North Carolina 2001).

In re Johnny F, 2002 W.L. 397046 (L.A. County Super.  Ct. 2002).

 

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